Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates by Graber, Mark A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 81
Issue 3 A Symposium on The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
Article 9
June 2006
Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and
the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates
Mark A. Graber
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 923
(2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol81/iss3/9
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM, JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, AND
THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES
MARK A. GRABER*
INTRODUCTION
Judicial supremacy was a central theme in the Lincoln-Douglas de-
bates from their very beginning. Shortly before their first encounter took
place, courts had handed down controversial decisions that purported to
settle political issues that were dividing the electorate. Both major partisan
coalitions mobilized in response to these assertions of judicial authority to
determine constitutional meaning. One party claimed that any effort to
interfere with the judiciary violated fundamental constitutional principles.
The other party claimed that what the Constitution meant should ultimately
be decided by the people themselves, that citizens have a right to challenge
judicial rulings they believe are deeply wrong. All of this is well-known.
What is less well-known is that the first Lincoln-Douglas clash over
the judiciary took place in 1840, that the forum was the state legislature of
Illinois, that the judicial decisions in question were made by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, that Douglas and his Jacksonian supporters championed
popular constitutionalism, and that Lincoln and his Whig supporters de-
fended judicial supremacy.1 Lincoln, Douglas, and their respective political
allies were battling over a measure, known as the "Douglas Bill," that
would have doubled the size of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and would
have allowed the additional judges to be appointed by a legislature con-
trolled by the Democratic Party. Courts had become controversial in Illi-
nois, as they had become in many states, because of a series of rulings that
either favored more commercial interests at the expense of agrarian con-
cerns or more generally favored Whigs at the expense of Jacksonian De-
* Professor of Government, University of Maryland, College Park, Professor of Law, University
of Maryland School of Law. Much thanks to Larry Kramer for an exceptionally thoughtful piece of
work and to the Chicago-Kent Law Review for their forbearance.
1. For a discussion of this controversy, see ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 92-
97 (1973). Johannsen suggests that Lincoln and Douglas may have previously clashed over Jacksonian
banking policy, another matter on which Douglas would have supported popular constitutionalism and
Lincoln would have advocated judicial supremacy. See id. at 29.
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mocrats. 2 Douglas and his political allies insisted that the people could take
the steps necessary to ensure that the state constitution was interpreted
consistently with popular Jacksonian constitutional understandings. They
celebrated "a court that will decide all questions of a political character
upon that broad basis of liberality which suits, and conforms to, the princi-
ples we mutually entertain."' 3 Lincoln and his political supporters vigor-
ously opposed any measure that would increase legislative control over the
judiciary. When the Douglas Bill became law, they issued a circular to the
citizens of Illinois complaining that "[t]he change proposed in the judiciary
was... destructive to the institutions of the country, and.., entirely at war
with the rights and liberties of the people." Lincoln asserted that, as a result
of this bill, "the independence of the Judiciary has been destroyed,... that
our rights of property and liberty of conscience can no longer be regarded
as safe from the encroachments of unconstitutional legislation."'4
These partisan attacks on and defenses of an independent judiciary
were typical of those made by Whigs and Jacksonians during the 1830s and
1840s. Such prominent Whigs as Daniel Webster celebrated judicial
power,5 and the young Lincoln was an orthodox Whig.6 Lincoln, as a state
legislator and congressman, consistently championed judicial supremacy.
An early speech in the Illinois state legislature asserted, "that the individu-
als composing our [state] Supreme Court have, in an official capacity, de-
cided in favor of the constitutionality of the Bank, would, in my mind,
seem a sufficient answer to" the claim that the state bank was unconstitu-
tional; the state judiciary, Lincoln stated, is the "tribunal, by which and
which alone, the constitutionality of the Bank can ever be settled."'7 Jack-
sonians before the Mexican War consistently "marginalized: the judiciary"
2. See id. at 82-87; Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses a Nation ": The Early
Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004).
3. JOHANNSEN, supra note 1, at 95 (quoting Adam Snyder, a local Jacksonian Democrat).
4. Abraham Lincoln et al., Circular from Whig Committee Against the Judiciary Bill: Appeal to
the People of the State of Illinois (Feb. 8, 1841) [hereinafter Lincoln, Circular], in I THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 234, 236-37 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED
WORKS].
5. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 176-78 (2004).
6. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 42, 52, 126-27 (1995).
7. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in the Illinois Legislature Concerning the State Bank (Jan I1,
1837), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 61, 62-63; see also id. at 69; Abraham Lincoln,
Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois: The Perpetuation of Our Political
Institutions (Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 108, 109, 112-13; Abraham
Lincoln, Speech on the Sub-Treasury (Dec. 26, 1839), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 159,
171; Lincoln, Circular, supra note 4, at 237; Abraham Lincoln, Whig Protest in Illinois Legislature
Against the Reorganization of the Judiciary (Feb. 26, 1841), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at
244, 247-48.
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and "reasserted popular control over constitutional development." 8 Douglas
first cut his political teeth supporting Andrew Jackson's veto of the bill
rechartering the Second Bank of the United States. That veto insisted that
legislative precedents were at least as authoritative as judicial precedents
for ascertaining constitutional meaning and asserted that presidents had a
constitutional obligation to veto legislation they thought unconstitutional,
even when courts had previously declared the exercise of federal power to
be constitutional. 9 As Lincoln pointed out in their 1858 debates, Douglas
during the bank wars of the 1830s strongly supported President Jackson's
decision to reject McCulloch v. MarylandlO as settling the constitutional
status of a national bank." I
By the eve of the Civil War, Douglas, Lincoln, and many of their po-
litical supporters had switched positions on institutional authority over
constitutional meaning. Douglas, during the more famous Lincoln-Douglas
debates, vigorously defended judicial supremacy. Jacksonians, after the
Mexican War, worked hard to secure a judicial ruling on the status of slav-
ery in the territories, 12 and Douglas was determined that the Dred Scott
decision' 3 be the final word on that matter. He charged Lincoln with mak-
ing "war on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case known as the
Dred Scott case." "I wish to say to you, fellow-citizens," he stated,
that I have no war to make on that decision, or any other ever rendered
by the Supreme Court. I am content to take that decision as it stands de-
livered by the highest judicial tribunal on earth, a tribunal established by
the Constitution of the United States for that purpose, and hence that de-
cision becomes the law of the land, binding on you, on me, and on every
other good citizen, whether we like it or not. Hence I do not choose to go
into an argument to prove, before this audience, whether or not Chief
Justice Taney understood the law better than Abraham Lincoln. 14
8. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 205.
9. Veto Message from President Andrew Jackson to the U.S. Senate (July 10, 1832) [hereinafter
Jackson Veto Message], in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
1789-1897, at 576,581-82 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter COMPILATION]. For Douglas's
support for Jackson's bank policies, see JOHANNSEN, supra note 1, at 24-27.
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11. See Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, First Debate with Steven A. Douglas at Ottawa,
Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858) [hereinafter Lincoln & Douglas, First Debate], in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 4, at I, 28; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858), in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 4 at 484, 496.
12. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 152-208 (1978); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Diffcul y: Legislative Defer-
ence to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 46-50 (1993); Wallace Mendelson, Dred Scott's
Case-Reconsidered, 38 MINN. L. REV. 16 (1954).
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jones-
boro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at 102, 112.
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Lincoln responded by sharply distinguishing judicial supremacy from
judicial review. Republicans were outraged by the Dred Scott decision, and
Lincoln favored banning slavery in the territories despite that judicial rul-
ing. "We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a
slave by the court," he declared,
we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when
any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be
slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus set-
tled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which
shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong,
which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to
favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that
decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that
way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and
spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for
spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it
as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon
this subject. 15
Part I of this article will show how this more complete history of the
Lincoln-Douglas debates provides additional support for the main thesis of
Larry Kramer's The People Themselves. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of
1840 are yet another instance when judicial power was contested in Ameri-
can history. As The People Themselves correctly points out, antebellum
Americans who objected to the substance of judicial decisions in constitu-
tional cases consistently challenged both the actual decisions that courts
had made and the authority of courts over constitutional meaning. As was
the case with the Douglas Bill in 1840 and the Republican Party platform
of 1860, proponents of popular constitutionalism were often able to influ-
ence decisively the course of state and national constitutional development.
What the working Constitution meant in the antebellum United States de-
pended as much on popular understandings, elections, and legislative de-
bate as on judicial decisions. 16 The frequency with which popular
15. Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Quincy,
Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858) [hereinafter Lincoln & Douglas, Sixth Debate], in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 4, at 245, 255. Dean Kramer and other commentators commonly treat this speech and a similar
passage in Lincoln's first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address-Final Text
(Mar. 4, 1861) [hereinafter Lincoln, First Inaugural Address], in 4 COLLECTED WORKS at 262, 268, as
canonical expressions of popular constitutionalism. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 211-12; Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965). Lincoln, however,
may have been asserting only that certain aberrant judicial decisions should not be considered authorita-
tive. This argument is developed in MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (forthcoming 2006).
16. This point is elaborated at length with respect to antebellum free speech theory in MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF
ExPREssION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000).
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movements successfully challenged judicial prerogative demonstrates that,
at the very least, no consensus existed in the United States on judicial su-
premacy before the Civil War. Contemporary proponents of judicial power
cannot justify judicial authority by pointing to an unbroken tradition begin-
ning with Marbury v. Madison,17 if not before, that regards the Supreme
Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional controversies.
Part II of this article will explain how the Lincoln-Douglas debates of
1840 and 1858 also cast doubt on a subtheme of The People Themselves
and raise questions about the way that work characterizes the relationships
between the judiciary and the rest of the political system. Dean Kramer
treats American constitutional history as an ongoing struggle between
"aristocrats" who support judicial supremacy and "democrats" committed
to a more popular constitutionalism. 18 The complete Lincoln-Douglas de-
bates suggest that political struggles to control constitutional meaning have
been more protean. Prominent political leaders who advocated judicial
supremacy at some times and on some issues celebrated popular constitu-
tionalism at other times and on other issues. Douglas was one of many
ambitious politicians who rose to power championing popular constitution-
alism, but after political allies established control over the courts, found
judicial supremacy a useful means for stabilizing their political coalition,
for exercising authority over resisting localities, and for entrenching their
policy preferences. 19 As the pattern of judicial decisions shifts, so does
partisan support for judicial power. Lincoln was one of many ambitious
politicians who first defended courts as a bulwark against an insurgent
political movement with an alternative constitutional vision, and then-
after the insurgents had consolidated power and gained control over the
judiciary-attacked courts when leading a different insurgent political
movement with an alternative constitutional vision. The Lincoln-Douglas
debates in both 1840 and 1858 were between two political leaders seeking
control over official constitutional meanings, not between a representative
of the people and a representative of the courts.
Part III will show how struggles over judicial power are struggles be-
tween political coalitions, each advancing a different constitutional vision
and each with different institutional strengths and weaknesses. Constitu-
tional politics consists of efforts to make distinctive constitutional visions
the official law of the land by controlling governmental institutions, em-
powering those institutions already controlled by political supporters, and
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 246-47.
19. Seesupra notes 3, !4 and acccmpanying text.
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weakening the authority of those institutions controlled by political rivals.
This enduring fight for political power better explains the complete Lin-
coln-Douglas debates and other episodes in American history than a more
narrow concern with judicial supremacy per se. Except during relatively
rare transitional periods, courts are almost always integrated into the
broader governing regime. 20 The Supreme Court of Illinois in 1840 was the
primary organ for Whig constitutional principles. The Taney Court in 1858
was a working member of the Jacksonian coalition. Douglas in 1840 and
Lincoln in 1858 were attacking institutions controlled by their political
rivals and regarded appeals to popular constitutionalism as efforts to trans-
fer constitutional authority to institutions they believed more favorably
disposed to their constitutional vision. Lincoln in 1840 and Douglas in
1858 were defending institutions controlled by their political supporters
and regarded appeals to popular constitutionalism as efforts to transfer
constitutional authority to institutions they believed less favorably disposed
to their constitutional vision.
Americans vote for and against these broader political coalitions. They
choose between Jacksonians and Whigs or between Republicans and De-
mocrats. Their choice is based on many factors, but approval of their fa-
vored coalition's more general constitutional vision is more likely to play a
greater role in electoral decisions than concerns with judicial supremacy
and popular constitutionalism. Persons who voted for a Democrat in 1840
may have voted to dismantle Whig-style judicial supremacy, but the same
Democrats in 1858 appeared to have voted to maintain Jacksonian-style
judicial supremacy. Most likely, they were voting for Jacksonian policies
on national banking and slavery, with questions of judicial power being
understood largely as means to secure those more important partisan goals.
The Republican victory in 1860 was less a triumph of the people over the
courts, than the triumph of Republican constitutional principles over Jack-
sonian constitutional principles.
Popular constitutionalism may be best conceived as describing the
process by which Americans choose their governing constitutional vision.
Judicial power is regarded largely as an instrumental means for securing
that vision. "A broad generalization, inaccurate only at the margins," Mark
Tushnet maintains,
is that nearly every constitutional theorist urges minimal judicial review
and vigorous democratic dialogue on issues on which the theorist be-
lieves her preferred position is likely to prevail in the democratic dia-
20. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 580 (2001) (reprinted from 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)).
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logue and more-than-minimal review on issues on which the theorist be-
lieves her preferred position is unlikely to prevail there.2 1
Citizens are little different. Surveys find that approval of judicial decisions
is highly correlated with support for the underlying policy.22 The nature of
this debate over constitutional authority highlights how the choice between
Lincoln and Douglas in 1840 and 1858 was not between democracy or
aristocracy or between rule by the courts and rule by the people, but be-
tween rule by Jacksonians and rule by Whigs/Republicans.
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
The People Themselves is directed at the common view that judicial
supremacy was constitutionally inevitable and largely uncontested
throughout American history. Contemporary Supreme Court justices repre-
senting the complete judicial spectrum have articulated this understanding
in opinions that insist that judicial control over constitutional meaning has
been the regime practice since at least 1803. Marbury v. Madison, the
unanimous tribunal in Cooper v. Aaron asserted, "declared the basic prin-
ciple that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system. ' ' 23 Forty years later, the Rehnquist Court similarly stated,
"the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution. '24
Distinguished constitutional commentators agree that American history has
settled debate over institutional responsibility for determining constitu-
tional meaning in favor of the federal judiciary. Professor Henry Hart of
Harvard Law School insisted that the Supreme Court
is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-
American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the structure of
American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative
function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing imper-
sonal and durable principles of constitutional law.25
"Democracy does not insist on judges having the last word," Ronald
Dworkin maintains, but "practice has now settled that courts do have a
21. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245, 245 n.4 (1995).
22. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme
Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 751, 768 (1989).
23. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
24. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
25. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices, 73 HA.V. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959).
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responsibility to declare and act on their best understanding of what the
Constitution forbids."26
Dworkin's historical justification for judicial supremacy is particularly
remarkable. He has famously asserted that constitutional interpretation
requires citizens and justices to assess both the morality of the practice
under constitutional attack and the extent to which that practice "fits" with
previous precedents and other accepted practices. "No theory can count as
an adequate justification of institutional history unless it provides a good fit
with that history," Taking Rights Seriously declares, "but if two or more
theories each provide an adequate fit, on that test, then the theory among
these that is morally the strongest provides the best justification, even
though it exposes more decisions as mistakes than another. '27 Many com-
mentators complain that "goodness" does all the work in Dworkin's argu-
ments, and "fit" almost none. 28 When discussing judicial supremacy,
however, Dworkin insists that all the work is done by "fit" and none by
"goodness." Debate over the jurisprudential merits of judicial supremacy
and popular constitutionalism has been, in his view, firmly settled by "prac-
tice." 29
The People Themselves and the complete Lincoln-Douglas debates
devastate this claim that judicial supremacy can be justified, independent of
the merits, by history, tradition, or practice. Americans in 1789, 1803,
1840, and 1858 did not self-consciously empower courts to determine for
the entire political system what the Constitution meant, nor did they
meekly acquiesce when justices asserted their authority to settle constitu-
tional conflicts. The persons responsible for the Constitution regarded the
large republic, representation, and the separation of powers as more effec-
tive means than "parchment barriers" and judicial review for protecting
fundamental rights and preserving limitations on national power. 30 When
some justices and their political supporters subsequently claimed that the
federal judiciary had the final say on those constitutional disputes that ex-
cited the body politic, those assertions were consistently and powerfully
26. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7, 12 (1996).
27. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 340 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diag-
nosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218, 239-40 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams
eds., 1998).
29. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 12.
30. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 31, 73, 84, at 196, 442, 514 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 41, 48,
57, at 255-56, 308-09, 313, 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Letter from
Roger Sherman (Dec. 8, 1787), in 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
386, 387 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983).
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challenged. Jefferson challenged judicial authority to declare the Alien and
Sedition Acts constitutional. 31 Jackson challenged judicial authority to
determine the constitutional status of the national bank.32 When the Su-
preme Court of Illinois interpreted the state constitution as forbidding a
Jacksonian governor from removing a Whig political appointee, 33 Douglas
and other Democrats insisted that the people's representatives in the state
legislature ought to determine the course of local constitutional develop-
ment. When the Supreme Court in Dred Scott interpreted the federal Con-
stitution as prohibiting Congress from banning slavery in the territories,
Lincoln and other Republicans insisted that the people's representatives in
the elected branches of the national government ought to determine the
course of American constitutional development. Fearing such political
challenges, antebellum justices often pulled their constitutional punches.
The Supreme Court in Marbury declined to order the Jefferson administra-
tion to deliver a judicial commission in part for fear that the judicial order
would be ignored. 34 The Marshall Court's maneuvers in Worcester v.
Georgia35 may be best explained by fears that President Jackson would not
implement a more aggressive judicial decision.36
Federal and state justices during the first half of the nineteenth century
at most gained the power to settle minor constitutional disputes. Prominent
politicians did not challenge the judicial authority to tinker with the juris-
dictional questions 37 or decide minor land disputes. 38 Much of the Supreme
Court's docket before the Civil War was devoted to straightening out land
titles in the West. 39 Although the cases sometimes raised constitutional
issues, popular movements took little notice when the stakes were limited
to which individual owned a particular tract of land. Justice John Catron
highlighted the low public salience of most contemporaneous Supreme
Court decisions when in 1845 he declared that Pollard v. Hagan is
31. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 141-42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1899).
32. See Jackson Veto Message, supra note 9.
33. Field v. People ex rel. McClemand, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79 (1839).
34. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25-28 (Sanford Levinson rev.,
4th ed. 2005).
35. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
36. See Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics,
12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229, 260-61 (1998).
37. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 560-62
(2005).
38. See Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53
VAND. L. REV. 73, 114 (2000).
39. Seeid.at ll6.
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"deemed the most important controversy ever brought before this court,
either as it respects the amount of property involved, or the principles on
which the present judgment proceeds. '40 The issue in Pollard concerned
the ownership of riverbeds when a territory became a state. 41 Constitutional
issues of more political consequence in Jacksonian America, such as the
national bank, internal improvements, tariffs, and national expansion, were
settled by elected officials with little if any judicial involvement. 42
The controversy over the Douglas Bill in Illinois and imbroglio over
judicial reorganization in Kentucky put in perspective the relative lack of
debate over national judicial power between 1830 and 1855. Charles War-
ren suggested that the decline of political attacks on the federal judiciary
after 1830 reflected an increasing acceptance of judicial power by persons
on all sides of the political spectrum. 43 The more accurate conclusion may
be that attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States waned because,
from Nullification to the Mexican War, the justices did not take positions
on the major controversies of the day. Jacksonians had no need to under-
mine their fellow Jacksonians who dominated the Supreme Court of the
United States after 1835. They consistently pilloried, however, every local
Whig judge who dared assert judicial authority in a state with a more ma-
joritarian political culture. Radical democrats in Kentucky reorganized the
state judicial system after the state supreme court declared unconstitutional
a legislative effort to provide debtor relief.44 Douglas and fellow Jackson-
ians in Illinois reorganized the state judicial system after the state supreme
court took Whig positions on several controversies. Many local elected
officials resisted or refused to implement state or federal court decisions
they believed illegitimate. 45 This history belies any national consensus on
judicial supremacy before the Civil War. Antebellum justices who at-
tempted to settle heated constitutional controversies inevitably provoked
powerful, often successful, attacks on their judicial authority.
Dean Kramer may overreach slightly when claiming that Marbury v.
Madison does not support judicial supremacy. The People Themselves in-
sists that Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury merely asserted "that courts
had the same duty and the same obligation to enforce the Constitution as
40. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 235 (1845) (Catron, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 220-21 (majority opinion).
42. See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 503-24 (2004).
43. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 206 (1947).
44. See Ruger, supra note 2, at 848-52.
45. See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early
United States (1790-1860) and the European Community (1958-94), 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149,
155-56, 166, 185 (1997).
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everyone else, both in and out of government."' 46 This seems mistaken.
Contrary to Dean Kramer's claim, 47 the passages on judicial power in the
Marbury opinion are largely a cut-and-paste job from the speeches leading
Federalists gave when defending a powerful judiciary during the debate
over the Repeal Act of 1802. Marshall's emphasis on the writtenness of the
Constitution was anticipated by Joseph Hemphill and others.48 His analysis
of limited government was anticipated by James Bayard and others. 49
James Tallmadge anticipated Marshall's assertion that the Constitution,
emanating from the people, is higher law than ordinary statutes. 50 Mar-
shall's parade of horribles in Marbury was nearly identical to those pro-
posed by many Federalist champions of judicial supremacy. 5 1 As did
Marshall in 1803, many Federalists mentioned the judicial oath to uphold
the Constitution as further evidence of the judicial power to declare laws
unconstitutional. 52 By comparison, Marshall in Marbury repeated no argu-
ment made by a Jeffersonian in 1802 who supported judicial review but not
the judicial power to bind elected officials. 53 Fourteen years after Marbury,
Marshall made a more explicit assertion of judicial supremacy. "On the
Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of our country to
devolved this important duty," he declared in McCulloch, to settle disputes
over the "constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital
parts."' 54 The precise legal holding of Marbury may be debatable, but John
Marshall clearly believed that the Supreme Court had the final say on what
the Constitution meant.
Popular constitutionalism does not need to enlist this judicial support.
What matters is political practice, not legal theory. When most people and
46. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 127.
47. See id. at 125.
48. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 536 (1802); see also id. at 163-64 (statement of Sen. Ross), 865-66
(statement of Rep. Cutler).
49. See id. at 645-48; see also id. at 56-58 (statement of Sen. Tracy), 131-32 (statement of Sen.
Chipman), 175-76 (statement of Sen. Ogden), 574-76 (statement of Rep. Stanley), 841-42 (statement
of Rep. Dennis).
50. See id. at 948; see also id. at 727-28, 739, 741, 743 (statement of Rep. Goddard), 783 (state-
ment of Rep. Griswold), 903-05, 920-32 (statement of Rep. Dana).
51. See id. at 163-67 (statement of Sen. Ross), 175-76 (statement of Sen. Ogden), 180-82 (state-
ment of Sen. Morris), 529-30 (statement of Rep. Henderson), 574-76 (statement of Rep. Stanley), 645-
48 (statement of Rep. Bayard), 689-91 (statement of Rep. Huger), 747-48, 754-56 759-60 (statement
of Rep. Rutledge), 841-42 (statement of Rep. Dennis), 881, 884 (statement of Rep. Hastings).
52. See id. at 182 (statement of Sen. Morris), 542 (statement of Rep. Hemphill), 574-76 (state-
ment of Rep. Stanley), 920 (statement of Rep. Dana).
53. See id. at 59, 61-63 (statement of Sen. Mason), 73-74 (statement of Sen. Stone), 115-16
(statement Sen. Wright), 557-58 (statement of Rep. Davis), 698-702 (statement of Rep. Smith), 982-83
(statement of Rep. Bacon).
54. McCuiloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 'Whea.) 316, 400, 401 (I819).
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elected officials do not treat judicial decisions as binding, then the working
Constitution does not regard those decisions as authoritative, no matter
what language might be found in judicial opinions. Michael Kent Curtis
detailed a popular political tradition in antebellum America that interpreted
constitutional free-speech rights far more broadly than most antebellum
courts. Abolitionists were legally free to speak in most northern states be-
cause northern state legislators were committed to libertarian readings of
the expression rights protected in the federal and state constitutions. The
constitutional law of free speech that structured political action, Curtis
found, was much different than the constitutional law on free speech found
in legal books. 55 Chief Justice Marshall may have asserted that courts were
the appropriate institution for settling the constitutional status of the na-
tional bank, but Andrew Jackson disagreed. Both Jackson and President
Tyler repeatedly vetoed on constitutional grounds bank bills that the Su-
preme Court had previously held to be constitutional.56 Lincoln in his 1858
debates with Douglas stated that the constitutional status of the national
bank had been settled by those Jacksonian presidential vetoes, and not by
Marshall's judicial opinion in McCulloch.57 If Lincoln was right that politi-
cal practice from 1831 to 1858 had established that the federal government
had no constitutional power to incorporate a national bank, then the same
political practice had clearly established that elected officials had the power
to settle constitutional controversies, even in the face of contrary judicial
precedent.
Prominent politicians before the Civil War supported judicial decision
making only when they favored the decisions the justices were making, had
political reasons for wanting justices to make the policy choice in question,
or did not care very much about the issues before the courts. When these
three conditions were absent, justices often found reasons for avoiding
controversial decisions. Marshall found a statutory excuse that enabled him
to avoid striking down southern laws imprisoning free seamen of color
whose ships docked in slave states. "[A]s I am not fond of butting against a
55. See CURTIS, supra note 16, at 3-4. Jon Gould observes that, at present, the popular constitu-
tional understandings of hate speech that structure political action are far more restrictive than the
constitutional law of hate speech handed down by the Supreme Court. See JON B. GOULD, SPEAK No
EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 5-8 (2005).
56. See Jackson Veto Message, supra note 9 (stating that Congress has no power to establish a
national bank); Veto Messages from President John Tyler to the U.S. Senate (Aug. 16, 1841), in 4
COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 63-68 (same); Veto Messages from President John Tyler to the U.S.
House of Representatives (Sept. 9, 1841), in 4 COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 68-72 (same).
57. See Lincoln & Douglas, Sixth Debate, supra note 15, at 268.
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wall in sport," he told Story, "I escaped on the construction of the act."'58
When justices nevertheless attempted to settle heated political controver-
sies, elected officials either reorganized the judicial system, as Douglas and
his supporters did in 1840, or ignored the judicial ruling, as Lincoln did
after taking office in 1861.59 In antebellum America, popular constitution-
alism was the political practice, even if judicial supremacy may have been
the legal theory.
II. TRADITIONS VERSUS COALITIONS
In addition to debunking claims that more than 200 years of practice
have established judicial supremacy, The People Themselves maintains that
American constitutional politics has been characterized by an ongoing bat-
tle between two opposing traditions, judicial supremacy and popular consti-
tutionalism. Dean Kramer asserts that "American politics have always been
defined by a struggle between two great principles." The first, "aristoc-
racy,... has always been concerned first and foremost with 'the excess of
democracy."' The second, "democracy," is championed by those with
"greater faith in the capacity of their fellow citizens to govern responsi-
bly." 60 This struggle between those with "differing sensibilities about
popular government and the political trustworthiness of ordinary people,"
Dean Kramer contends, is "a very old conflict: one that started the moment
Americans set their sights on creating a republic and that has scarcely ever
flagged since then."' 61 Kramer recognizes important differences between
eighteenth-century Federalists and Jeffersonians on the one hand, and turn
of the twenty-first century liberals and conservatives on the other. Never-
theless, The People Themselves concludes that "while the field of battle
may have changed over time, it is still the same old war." Contemporary
58. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 26, 1823), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS, JANUARY 1820-
DECEMBER 1823, at 338 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998). Marshall probably engaged in similar statutory
and treaty misconstruction in such cases as United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103
(1801), Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801), and Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804), in order to avoid challenging Jeffersonian understandings of legal obligations engendered by the
naval conflict against France, and in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), in order to
avoid challenging Virginian understandings of state constitutional obligations. See Mark A. Graber,
Establishing Judicial Review?: Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221
(1998); Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic
Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67 (1995).
59. The Lincoln administration in 1862 declared that free blacks were American citizens, and
Congress that year banned slavery in all American territories. See 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1862); see
also Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 ("An Act to secure Freedom to all Persons within the
Territories of the United States").
60. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 246-47.
61. id. at 246.
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"supporters of judicial supremacy are today's aristocrats." Contemporary
popular constitutionalists count the following as their "intellectual fore-
bears: Jefferson, Madison, and Van Buren."62
The complete Lincoln-Douglas debates belie this assertion. If Kramer
is correct, then Lincoln in 1858 could have counted Douglas in 1840 as one
of his "intellectual forebears," while Lincoln in 1840 was part of a tradition
that included Douglas in 1858. A Republican coalition, three-fourths of
whose members were former Whigs, 63 would have been the heirs to the
Jacksonian tradition, while such committed Jacksonians as James Bu-
chanan ought to have considered Daniel Webster a venerable ancestor.
Neither Lincoln nor Douglas exhibited such a wholesale transformation in
political orientation. Lincoln idolized Henry Clay throughout his career.64
Douglas and other Democrats continually venerated the memory of An-
drew Jackson. 65 Professor Joel Silbey's study of party politics during the
nineteenth century concludes that "both the Democrats and their opponents
remained true to their commitments" from 1838 until 1893.66
Lincoln, Douglas, Jacksonians, and Whigs were not the only Ameri-
can politicians or political parties whose attitudes toward institutional au-
thority over constitutional meaning evolved in response to political events.
Prominent Federalists and Jeffersonians switched sides in the political de-
bates over judicial supremacy that took place during the last decade of the
eighteenth century. New Deal liberals attacked judicial activism during the
1930s, learned to love judicial power during the 1950s and 1960s, but are
having second thoughts at the turn of the twenty-first century. Some con-
temporary conservatives are becoming more enamored of judicial power,
and are even calling for the judiciary to protect unenumerated constitu-
tional rights. Kramer is correct to note the ongoing struggle over judicial
power in American history, but the struggles have been between different
political coalitions rather than between representatives of "aristocratic" and
"democratic" political traditions.
Neither Lincoln nor Douglas adhered to fixed aristocratic or democ-
ratic understandings of judicial power throughout their political careers.
Lincoln championed judicial supremacy when he was a Whig, but more
62. Id. at 247.
63. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 167 (1970) (describing the makeup of the coalition).
64. See Lincoln & Douglas, First Debate, supra note 11, at 29 (declaring "Henry Clay" was "my
beau ideal of a statesman, the man for whom I fought all my humble life").
65. See JOHANNSEN, supra note 1, at 381.
66. JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838-1893, at 88 (1991).
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aggressively challenged courts when he became a Republican. 67 Douglas
supported Jacksonian attacks on courts during the 1830s and 1840s, and
then endorsed Jacksonian efforts to make federal courts the final arbiter of
slavery questions during the 1850S.68 Their differing orientation toward
courts does not appear to correspond to any change in their more general
political principles or attitudes towards popular participation in politics.
Douglas championed a limited federal economic role and national expan-
sion throughout his career. 69 Lincoln left the Whig party only when he
perceived that coalition no longer had the capacity to win elections, not
because he had abandoned faith in the American System championed by
Henry Clay. 70 Lincoln and Douglas advocated different positions on judi-
cial power in 1858 than they did in 1840 partly because control over the
judiciary had changed and partly because the issues being adjudicated by
the judiciary had changed.
Lincoln, Douglas, Jacksonians, and Whigs during the 1830s and 1840s
were debating the authority of state and federal judicial systems dominated
by Whigs. Members of the Marshall Court had campaigned for John
Quincy Adams in 1828. 71 Most state judges were identified with the more
commercial wing of the fragmenting Jeffersonian coalition or with the op-
position to rising Jacksonian coalition.72 Jacksonians opposed and Whigs
celebrated judicial power in this political environment, partly because judi-
cial power was generally understood to be a means for advancing Whig
constitutional visions. As Jacksonians consolidated their control over the
federal judiciary, they soon found judicial supremacy useful as a means for
advancing Jacksonian political goals and for holding together a decaying
coalition. 73 Northern Whigs, who had been the most enthusiastic champi-
ons of the Marshall Court, proved less enamored with judicial power when
exercised by the Southern-dominated Taney Court. 74
The evolution of the Jacksonian-Whig debate over judicial power was
anticipated by the evolution of the Federalist-Jeffersonian debate over judi-
cial power. During the early 1790s, prominent Jeffersonians defended and
prominent Federalists questioned the judicial power to declare federal laws
67. See supra notes 7, 15 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 3, 14 and accompanying text.
69. See Lincoln & Douglas, First Debate, supra note 1I, at 1-2.
70. See DONALD, supra note 6, at 188-91.
71. Graber, supra note 36, at 263.
72. See Ruger, supra note 2, at 832-33, 867.
73. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (forthcoming
2007); Graber, supra note 12, 46-50.
74. See 2 WARREN, supra note 43, at 213-14.
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unconstitutional. When the justices on circuit declared that Congress could
not vest them with the power to determine whether Revolutionary War
veterans were legally entitled to invalid pensions when judicial rulings
were subject to review by a cabinet official, 75 James Madison writing to
Henry Lee celebrated this effort to call "the attention of the Pu[b]lic to
Legislative fallibility." "[P]erhaps they may be wrong in the exertion of
their power," he stated, "but such an evidence of its existence gives inquie-
tude to those who do not wish congress to be controuled or doubted .... ,,76
The National Gazette, a Jeffersonian newspaper, was even more enthusias-
tic about this exercise of legal authority. The editor declared that a judicial
decision holding a federal law "unconstitutional, must be a matter of high
gratification to every republican and friend of liberty: since it assures the
people of ample protection to their constitutional rights and privileges,
against any attempt of legislative and executive oppression. '77 Federalists
were less excited about the first federal decision declaring congressional
legislation unconstitutional. Fisher Ames wrote Thomas Dwight that the
"decision of the Judges, on the validity of our pension law, is generally
censured as indiscreet and erroneous." 78
A decade later, Federalists were championing judicial supremacy and
Jeffersonians insisting the electoral branches of the national government
had equal power to determine what the Constitution meant. The consis-
tency with which federal courts sustained the Alien and Sedition Acts and
other Federalist measures implemented during the undeclared war against
France, 79 as well as the partisan composition of the federal judiciary, were
the crucial events responsible for these altered political commitments. 80
When the Alien and Sedition Acts were initially passed, some Jeffersonians
continued looking to the federal courts for relief against Congress.81 Feder-
alists became firmly committed to an expanded federal judiciary and Jef-
75. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
76. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Apr. 15, 1792), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 50 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) [herein-
after DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
77. NAT'L GAZETTE (Phila.), April 16, 1792, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
76, at 52.
78. Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (April 25, 1792), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 76, at 57.
79. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 126-28, 214, 247-49, 253 (1995).
80. See Mark A. Graber, The Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review, in THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 28, 36 (Howard Gilman &
Cornell Clayton eds., 1999).
81. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1991, 2111 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harper); id. at 2152 (statement
of Rep. Macon).
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fersonians became firmly committed to popular constitutionalism only
when events clarified which side the federal judiciary was on in the politi-
cal struggles of the time. The Judiciary Act of 1801, which dramatically
expanded the federal judiciary, and the Adams administration's decision to
fill all of those judicial vacancies with prominent Federalists cemented the
new partisan views on judicial power. Federalists, who seemed unsure
about judicial power in 1792, in 1802 described the Supreme Court as "that
fortress of the Constitution. '82 Jeffersonians, who had previously called on
the Supreme Court to strike down Federalist measures, in 1802 described
as "novel" the claim that "the nation is to look up to these immaculate
judges to protect their liberties. '83
American politics over the last hundred years similarly confounds any
effort to place the proponents and opponents of judicial power into such
neat conceptual categories as "aristocrats" and "democrats." During the
first third of the twentieth century, progressives bitterly fought to reduce
the power of federal courts and make courts more accountable to elected
officials and popular opinion.84 Prominent conservatives before the New
Deal, such as President and later Chief Justice William Howard Taft, in-
sisted that federal courts and judicial power were the best instruments for
protecting property rights and preventing communism. 85 When New Deal-
ers gained control of the federal court system by the end of the Franklin
Roosevelt administration, many liberals lost their inhibitions about judicial
power. Courts became another agent of democracy, protecting democratic
processes and "discreet and insular minorities. '86 Conservatives during the
heyday of the Warren Court complained about an "imperial judiciary" that
was undermining American democracy.87 When conservatives during the
Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations once again regained con-
trol of the federal court system, they did not institute a new regime of judi-
cial restraint. Rather, a conservative Rehnquist Court majority has declared
more federal laws unconstitutional than any other tribunal in American
history.88 Responding to these practices, many liberals are complaining
about "an increasingly Imperial Court" that "does not feel bound by consti-
82. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 91 (1802) (statement of Sen. Morris).
83. Id. at 75 (statement of Sen. Cocke).
84. See generally WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994).
85. See generally Walter F. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme
Court Appointments, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1961).
86. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
87. See Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975).
88. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004).
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tutional text, precedent, prudential restraint,. . . the votes of the popu-
lace,... the usual constraints of judicial craftsmanship," or "the messy
processes of democracy .... "89 . :-. ..
As was the case with Lincoln and Douglas, these changing attitudes
towards judicial power throughout American history do not appear to cor-
respond to changing attitudes on other issues. Republicans throughout the
1790s were more committed than Federalists to popular participation in
politics, and they were always less committed to a strong national govern-
ment. Time was needed for each coalition to determine whether the Su-
preme Court was likely to favor its distinctive constitutional vision.
Progressives and liberals for the past fifty years have always been more
committed to economic redistribution and racial egalitarianism than con-
servatives. What has changed is the extent to which the Supreme Court has
been willing to support progressive or conservative goals.
Lincoln, Douglas, and other Americans also responded differently to
different exercises of judicial power because their more general constitu-
tional visions did not commit them to either judicial supremacy or popular
constitutionalism on all the issues of the day. Contrary to Kramer's thesis,
neither "democrat" nor "aristocrat" does justice to historical attitudes to-
ward judicial power. Rather, Lincoln and Douglas had broader political and
legal commitments that justified supporting Supreme Court policymaking
in some instances and not others. The differences in their rhetoric of 1840
and 1858 were neither a consequence of pure politics nor principles entirely
abstracted from politics, but an integration of political and principled con-
siderations that is typical of American constitutionalism. Whigs and Jack-
sonians both championed general principles that could be used to defend
and oppose judicial power. Which principles were invoked was partly a
function of which political coalition controlled the judiciary. Nevertheless,
constitutional argument was not purely instrumental. General principles
both structured and limited partisan attacks on federal courts. Whigs and
Jacksonians advocated different conditions under which justices were au-
thorized to settle constitutional disputes. Lincoln and Douglas were more
approving of judicial decisions when their fellow partisans were on the
bench, partly because their partisans were likely to make the sort of judicial
decisions they believed appropriately settled constitutional disputes. Never-
theless, both Lincoln and Douglas deferred to judicial decisions that met
their conditions for finality, even when they disagreed with the judicial
policy choice.
89. Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REv. 699, 701 (2002).
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Lincoln's attack on Dred Scott was consistent with the Whig view that
courts should be above the political fray. "[I]t... might be.. . factious,
nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent," he wrote in
1858, had Dred Scott "been made by the unanimous concurrence of the
judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with
legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments in
our history." Democrats had no business attacking courts in 1840, Lincoln
believed, because the judicial decisions in question were made "without
any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expecta-
tion." The Taney Court did not settle the constitutional status of slavery in
the territories because Dred Scott was "wanting in all these claims to the
public confidence." 90 Consistent with his Whig commitment to judicial
power, Lincoln on the campaign trail claimed that Republican political
efforts were directed not at an executive overthrow of a judicial regime, but
at having Dred Scott "reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule estab-
lished upon this subject." 91
Lincoln accepted proslavery judicial decisions that satisfied "these
claims to the public confidence." His first inaugural address denied that
"the policy of the government" on slavery in the territories could "be ir-
revocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made,"'92 but implied that "the policy of the government" on fugitive slaves
had been "irrevocably fixed" by a series of Supreme Court decisions. When
discussing sectional controversies over the rendition process, Lincoln sug-
gested, "it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to
conform to, and abide by, all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to
violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be
unconstitutional." 93 He had previously informed Republican senators
"[t]hat the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution ought to be enforced by
a law of Congress, with efficient provisions for that object. '94 The differ-
ence between his position on slavery in the territories and the rendition of
fugitive slaves may have been rooted in what Lincoln perceived as the dif-
ference between Dred Scott and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.95 In sharp contrast
to the former decision, Prigg was unanimous. Justices from the free and
90. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 4, at 398, 400-01.
91. Lincoln & Douglas, Sixth Debate, supra note 15, at 255.
92. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, supra note 15, at 268.
93. Id. at 264.
94. Abraham Lincoln, Resolutions Drawn up for Republican Members of Senate Committee of
Thirteen (Dec. 20, 1860) [hereinafter Lincoln, Resolutions], in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 4, at
156. 156-57.
95. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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slave states, who were nominated by Whig and Jacksonian presidents, all
agreed that Congress had the right to pass fugitive slave laws. Unlike Dred
Scott, Prigg at the time of the first inaugural had been reaffirmed by federal
courts. 96 While Lincoln clearly preferred that alleged fugitive slaves have
more procedural safeguards, 97 he was less willing to challenge judicial
decisions that met Whig standards for constitutional authority.98
Douglas's defense of Dred Scott in 1858 was consistent with his ear-
lier Jacksonian opposition to judicial power. Jacksonians objected to judi-
cial power unsanctioned by contemporary majorities. Judicial supremacy
was justified, however, when popular majorities self-consciously empow-
ered courts to settle particular constitutional disputes. Jurisdictional grants
were a common means by which Jacksonians vested courts with the power
to settle constitutional disputes. Democrats believed that Congress had
complete control of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 99 If the
people through their representatives in the legislature had determined that a
constitutional dispute was best settled by adjudication, then Jacksonians
could reconcile popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy.100 From
this perspective, Douglas's positions on judicial power in 1840 and 1858
were consistent. In sharp contrast to the behavior of the Illinois courts in
the late 1830s, federal courts in the 1850s had been authorized to determine
the constitutional status of slavery. As Jefferson Davis reminded his con-
temporaries, the Supreme Court was "the umpire selected as the referee in
the controversy."' 101 Having supported the legislative decision authorizing
courts to decide the constitutional status of slavery in the territories, Doug-
las accepted the Dred Scott decision even though he favored popular sover-
eignty. Douglas later favored legislation empowering the Supreme Court to
determine whether Congress was obligated to pass a slave code for the
territories, even though he probably thought that the Supreme Court would
hand down a decision that would further undermine popular sovereignty. 102
As was the case with Lincoln, Douglas was committed to neither popular
96. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 215, 229 (1847).
97. See Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, supra note 15, at 264.
98. See id.; Lincoln, Resolutions, supra note 94, at 157.
99. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementa-
tion of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1608 (1986).
100. See Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During the Civil
War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 58
(Ronald Kahn & Kenneth Kersch eds., forthcoming 2006).
101. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1940 (1860).
102. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 12, at 537-38.
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constitutionalism nor to judicial supremacy, but to a set of conditions for
determining when a judicial decision was authoritative.
Americans during the twentieth century have similarly been more
committed to various sets of conditions for determining when judicial deci-
sions are authoritative than to either popular constitutionalism or judicial
supremacy in the abstract. 103 The primary liberal and progressive criticisms
of early twentieth-century judicial activism were that courts lack the exper-
tise and democratic pedigree necessary to make economic policy. 10 4 New
Dealers did not abandon this position once they gained control of the judi-
ciary. Many, most notably Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and Raoul
Berger, insisted throughout their lives that liberal judicial activism was no
better than conservative judicial activism. 105 Other jurists on the political
left began insisting that the democratic principles underlying previous lib-
eral attacks on such decisions as Lochner v. New York 106 could be em-
ployed to justify judicial activism on behalf of the democratic process and
persons of color. 107 Whether liberals would have developed these argu-
ments had conservatives maintained control of the courts is doubtful. Nev-
ertheless, liberal justifications for popular constitutionalism before the New
Deal influenced liberal justifications for judicial supremacy after the New
Deal. With rare exceptions, 108 progressive and liberal justices were very
slow to develop arguments for protecting the fundamental rights to basic
necessities, in part because such activism was more difficult to justify using
the principles first developed to attack judicial policymaking on economic
matters. 109
Generational change may also better explain the course of political
debate over judicial power than enduring democratic or aristocratic sensi-
bilities. History provides some reason for thinking that many political ac-
tors throughout their lives emphasize those elements of their broader
political principles that were activated by their first committed participation
103. The argument in this paragraph is elaborated at length in MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING
FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991).
104. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Roscoe Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). See also GRABER, supra note 103, at 69-74.
105. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525-26 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Atheneum 1965) (1958); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
106. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
107. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 361 (Harvard Univ. Press
1967) (1941); Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 1 (1943).
108. See, e.g., Frank 1. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
109. See GRABER. supra note 103, at 184-215; ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR:
THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997).
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in debates over judicial power. Neither Lincoln nor Douglas played any
prominent role in the heated political debates over the proposed repeal of
section 25 of the Judiciary Act that occupied politicians during the first
third of the nineteenth century. 1 0 Not having committed themselves in
their political youth to a fixed position on judicial power, each was politi-
cally and intellectually freer than their political elders to adopt Jacksonian
or Whig/Republican principles to the political debates that most concerned
their political generation. Not surprisingly, therefore, the generation that
regarded Dred Scott as the quintessential example of judicial power ana-
lyzed institutional authority differently than the generation that began its
analysis thinking about McCulloch.
Americans witnessed the similar impact of generational change after
the New Deal. Most prominent academics who came of age during the
1930s had difficulty accepting judicial activism, even when the justices
were making policies they supported."I ' By contrast, such liberal scholars
as Ronald Dworkin and Lawrence Tribe, who came of age during the hey-
day of the Warren Court, have supported judicial supremacy, even in the
face of Burger and Rehnquist Court decisions that increasingly wield judi-
cial power for conservative causes. Contemporary proponents of popular
constitutionalism or the Constitution outside of the courts are either the few
members of an older generation who raised questions about judicial power
before the advent of the Rehnquist Court, 112 or scholars, such as Larry
Kramer, who came of age long after the Warren Court ended. The leading
academic proponents of conservative judicial activism at present are
younger scholars who barely remember the Burger, much less the Warren
Court. The originalist rhetoric that presently underlies much conservative
judicial activism was first wielded by an earlier generation of conservatives
to oppose liberal judicial activism.1 13
Attitudes towards judicial supremacy also reflect the life cycle of po-
litical coalitions. Keith Whittington brilliantly documents in a forthcoming
book 114 how presidential understandings of judicial authority have de-
110. See generally Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the
United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 161 (1913).
111. See Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for
Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 218, 236-38 (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983).
112. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
113. See KECK, supra note 88, at 4-8.
114. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 73. The following paragraph relies heavily on Professor Whit-
tington's pathbreaking research.
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pended on the place of the presidency in "political time."' 1 5 Reconstructive
presidents who come to power with a license to overturn the constitutional
commitments of a previous political regime almost always advocate some
version of popular constitutionalism or departmentalism. Jackson, Lincoln,
and Franklin Roosevelt sought to weaken the authority of courts that they
regarded as the last outpost of a deposed coalition.' 16 Affiliated and dis-
junctive presidents whose main task is keeping together their fraying politi-
cal coalitions typically support judicial power as a means for overcoming
the increased fragmentation of the polity they govern. John Quincy Adams,
James Buchanan, and Herbert Hoover were judicial supremacists in part
because they regarded courts as a bulwark against the political forces that
were causing their partisan regime to disintegrate. 117 That weakened coali-
tions increasingly employ courts as means for preserving political power
complicates Kramer's assertion that "[w]hat is certain is that popular con-
stitutionalism was the clear victor each time matters came to a head."",l 8
Increased reliance on courts is more often a consequence than the cause of
political vulnerability. A Jacksonian coalition strong enough to withstand
Lincoln in 1860 probably would have been strong enough to pass its pro-
gram legislatively rather than rely on courts to protect slavery in the territo-
ries.
Dean Kramer recognizes how debates over judicial supremacy have
historically evolved when he observes, "Rather than discuss faction, as
Federalists had done in the 1790s, [Joseph] Story focused on nullification
and the claim that every state could interpret the Constitution for itself.""19
Rather than ask whether this might reflect fundamental differences in Fed-
eralist and Whig orientations to politics, however, The People Themselves
treats the need for uniformity as a variation on the enduring aristocratic
distrust of popular politics. 120 The better view is that every political coali-
tion that has contested elections for more than a generation has articulated
general principles that may be employed to defend both popular constitu-
tionalism and judicial supremacy. Douglas in 1858 demonstrated how the
Jacksonian principles he articulated in 1840 when defending popular con-
115. For the concept of "political time," see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS
MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 49-52 (1993). Professor Skowronek also
developed the concept of reconstructive, affiliated, and disjunctive presidencies discussed in this para-
graph. See id. at 34-45.
116. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 73. Chapter 2 in Whittington's forthcoming book is of particu-
lar relevance.
117. See id. Chapter 3 is relevant to this point.
118. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 207.
119. Id. at 184.
120. See id. at 187-89.
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stitutionalism could be used to justify judicial supremacy. Lincoln in 1858
demonstrated how the Whig principles he articulated in 1840 when defend-
ing judicial supremacy could be used to justify popular constitutionalism.
The relative merits of their arguments about institutional authority lie in the
relative merits of Whig and Jacksonian constitutional principles, not in the
relative merits of democracy and aristocracy.
III. THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE PEOPLE
American constitutional politics is best characterized as an ongoing
struggle between people who want to empower courts to make certain pub-
lic policies and people who believe those policies should be made by other
institutions. Most Jacksonian Democrats during the 1830s and early 1840s
sought to reduce the power of the judiciary. Most Whigs during that time
period favored a powerful court system. Both coalitions were supported by
approximately half the voting age population. While Whigs enjoyed greater
support among the commercial classes, each coalition enjoyed substantial
support from elites and each had a deep mass base. 121 A similar story can
be told about contemporary constitutional politics. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in his Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey opinion, both proponents and opponents of judicial protection for
abortion rights enjoy the popular support necessary to generate mass dem-
onstrations. 122 Pro-choice people march in favor of judicial authority over
reproductive choice. Pro-life people presently demonstrate for legislative
authority. Both political movements are more interested in securing their
constitutional vision than in the precise allocation of institutional authority.
Justices deciding whether to reaffirm Roe v. Wade123 choose between these
different coalitions of people, not between an abstracted "people" and the
courts.
The prominent politicians and political movements involved in these
political struggles over institutional authority have not remained fixed or
exhibited fixed characteristics throughout American history. Madison was
only the first of the many prominent American constitutional thinkers
whose attitude towards judicial power changed with the times. Douglas and
other northern Jacksonians became more sympathetic to judicial power
during the 1850s. Lincoln and other northern Whigs, now calling them-
121. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 213-18 (1999).
122. 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992).
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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selves Republicans, 124 became less sympathetic. Liberals during the 1930s
complained about "government by judiciary." 125 The next generation of
liberals celebrated the federal courts as "the forum of principle."' 126 The
next liberal generation is elaborating a more popular constitutionalism. 127
Senior conservatives who fulminated against judicial activism 128 are being
replaced by younger conservatives who advance different versions of a
"Constitution-in-exile" when advocating substantial judicial activism on
behalf of property rights and federalism. 129
The arguments for judicial supremacy have also evolved over time.
Whigs emphasized that judicial supremacy was necessary to ensure a uni-
fied national economy. 130 Jacksonians during the 1850s insisted that judi-
cial supremacy was necessary to prevent sectional issues from disrupting
the Union.131 Conservatives at the turn of the twentieth century maintained
that judicial supremacy was necessary to protect property rights,]32 while
liberals during the middle twentieth century maintained that judicial su-
premacy was necessary to protect minority rights. 133 These different justifi-
cations for judicial power influenced how judicial power was exercised.
Jacksonians wanted courts to impose national solutions for slavery prob-
lems, but were more inclined to leave other economic issues to the states.
Liberals after the New Deal called on Supreme Court justices to protect
free-speech rights, but not economic rights, even those economic rights
they believed were central to a truly functioning system of free speech. 134
The People Themselves tells a more a monolithic story, one suspects,
because Kramer remains under the influence of the counter-majoritarianism
difficulty. Alexander Bickel, who coined the phrase, indicated that consti-
124. See FONER supra note 63, at 167.
125. See Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993)
(1932).
126. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516-18 (1981).
127. See KRAMER, supra note 5; TUSHNET, supra note 112.
128. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1990).
129. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, Winter 1995, at 83
(1995) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)).
130. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340 (1816).
131. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 455 (1857) (Wayne, J., concurring)
("[T]he peace and harmony of the country required the settlement [of the status of slavery in the territo-
ries] by judicial decision.").
132. See William Howard Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, 10 YALE REV. 1 (1920).
133. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287, 1295 (1982).
134. See GRABER, supra note i03, at i59-64.
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tutional politics was a struggle between the people and the courts. "[W]hen
the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action
of an elected executive," Bickel maintained, "it thwarts the will of the rep-
resentatives of the actual people of the here and now." 135 Seen from this
perspective, Kramer's work is both revolutionary and very traditional.
Unlike many proponents of grand constitutional theory, Kramer sides with
the people in their struggles against the courts. Like the proponents of
grand constitutional theory, Kramer regards these struggles as contests
between the people and the courts.
Contemporary political science is offering a new interpretation of po-
litical struggles over the institutional power to settle constitutional mean-
ing. Judicial review, students of public law declare, is "politically
constructed" 136 or has "political foundations." 137 Justices declare federal
and state laws unconstitutional, in this view, only when they are explicitly
or implicitly invited to do so by members of the dominant political coali-
tion, or when there is good reason to believe that at least some members of
the dominant political coalition will support that exercise of judicial power.
Elected officials have historically supported judicial power and judicial
supremacy because they wish to avoid responsibility for settling particu-
larly contentious and cross-cutting social issues, 138 because the judiciary
may be seen as an ally against other institutions controlled by different
coalitions, 139 or because they wish to entrench themselves against the pos-
sibility of electoral defeat. 140 Elected officials empower courts by expand-
ing their jurisdiction, passing vague laws that require justices to make
policy in the guise of interpretation, supporting litigation aimed at declaring
laws unconstitutional, appointing known proponents of judicial power to
the bench, and otherwise signaling to the courts that they favor-or at least
do not oppose-certain aggressive uses ofjudicial power. 141
135. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
136. See Keith E. Whittington, The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 261,
262 (Sotirios A. Barber& Robert P. George eds., 2001).
137. Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005).
138. See Graber, supra note 12; GEORGE 1. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY
AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003).
139. See Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exer-
cise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591-93; KEVIN J.
MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO
BROWN (2004).
140. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance
their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002).
141. See Graber, supra note 137, at 426-27.
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Politically constructed judicial review does not present the classic
counter-majoritarian difficulty. When justices declare laws unconstitu-
tional, they thwart the will of some elected officials, but are supported by
other elected representatives of the people of the here and now. Many
elected officials who support particular instances of judicial power play
prominent roles in the dominant majority coalition. President James Bu-
chanan enthusiastically supported the judicial decision in the Dred Scott
case. 142 The Supreme Court's new federalism offensive is quite consistent
with the more limited federal role in certain domestic policies championed
by prominent Republicans. 143
Judicial review more often than not presents clashing majoritarian
problems or non-majoritarian problems. 144 Clashing majoritarian problems
occur when majorities in one branch of government or one governmental
institution disagree with majorities in another branch or institution, each
with a plausible claim to speak for the people. Good examples include
abortion during the 1980s, which pitted a pro-life executive against a pro-
choice congressional majority, and Brown v. Board of Education,145 which
pitted an antisegregation executive branch against prosegregation southern
states. Non-majoritarian problems occur when no majority has formed in
favor of any specific policy. Good examples include slavery during the
1850s and campaign finance reform during the 1970s. Clashing majori-
tarian and non-majoritarian problems present issues for democratic theory,
but those issues cannot be framed as judicial review versus democracy or
as democracy versus aristocracy. As I have written elsewhere,
The merits of judicial review lie in the extent to which that practice
serves values internal to democracy, rather than in the choice between
democratic and some other values. All democratic institutions privilege
some people at the expense of others. Whether judicial review is desir-
able depends on the interests democracies should privilege and whether
judicial review privileges those interests in a democratically appropriate
matter. 146
142. See Third Annual Message from President James Buchanan to the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives (Dec. 19, 1859), in 5 COMPILATION, supra note 9, at 3083, 3085; JEREMIAH SULLIVAN
BLACK, OBSERVATIONS ON SENATOR DOUGLAS'S VIEWS OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS EXPRESSED IN
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, FOR SEPTEMBER, 1859 (Washington, Thomas McGill 1859).
143. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynam-
ics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us:
Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001).
144. For a more general discussion of the clashing and non-majoritarian problems discussed in this
paragraph, see Graber, supra note 12, at 37, 61-65.
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. Graber, supra note 137, at 447.
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Judicial supremacy in a world where judicial power is politically con-
structed is both an alternative to and a consequence of popular constitution-
alism. Some proponents of judicial supremacy maintain that the people
cannot be trusted with constitutional meaning. 147 Others have favored judi-
cial supremacy on some issues because they prefer rule by national majori-
ties to rule by local majorities, because they prefer popular
constitutionalism on other issues, or because they believe the Supreme
Court is likely to side with the elected branch of the national government
controlled by their partisans when that branch disagrees with the elected
branch of the national government controlled by their political oppo-
nents. 148 Both "aristocratic" and more "democratic" proponents of judicial
supremacy seek to secure their constitutional vision by persuading their
fellow citizens and elected officials that their institutional vision should
become the law of the land. Sustained periods of judicial policymaking
have occurred historically only when proponents of a strong judiciary have
secured at least partial control over at least one elected branch of govern-
ment. Judicial review takes place with the permission of these elected offi-
cials and, at most, "thwarts the will" of elected officials in other governing
institutions. This seems consistent with popular constitutionalism. If the
people should ultimately decide what the Constitution means, then the peo-
ple decide the allocation of constitutional authority as well as how constitu-
tional provisions concerning the powers of government and individual
rights should be interpreted. Douglas in 1858 was as much speaking for the
people when, affirming judicial power to decide the status of slavery in the
territories, he defeated Lincoln in the Illinois Senate election as Lincoln
was in 1860 when, challenging that judicial authority, he defeated Douglas
for the presidency.
CONCLUSION
Popular constitutionalists who recognize that judicial power is politi-
cally constructed nevertheless have reasons for supporting Dean Kramer's
criticisms of the Rehnquist Court. Judicial supremacy in the past was de-
fended on its merits and was partly a consequence of electoral victories by
coalitions that articulated their understanding of judicial power on the cam-
paign trail. Democrats during the 1852 and 1856 election campaigns openly
declared that they believed the Supreme Court was the proper institution to
settle divisive debates over slavery. 149 Lyndon Johnson in 1964 proudly
147. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 131-32.
148. See Graber, supra note 137, at 426-27, 446.
149. See Mendelson, supra note 12.
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burnished his support for the Warren Court. 150 Their electoral victories
provided Dred Scott and Brown with democratic foundations. The reigning
Republican majority, by comparison, campaigns against judicial power.
President Bush repeatedly condemns "activist judges."' 15 1 Republican judi-
cial appointees offer no justification of judicial supremacy other than that
the Supreme Court has always been the final arbiter of constitutional mean-
ing.152 Dean Kramer demonstrates that their historical analysis is mistaken.
Judicial power has been contested throughout American history. As often
as not, officials outside the judiciary have had as much to say about official
constitutional meanings as judicial actors. If the contemporary Republican
majority intends for the judiciary to institute some version of the "Constitu-
tion-in-exile,"' 153 The People Themselves demands and the people them-
selves ought to demand that the Bush administration publicly announce
their general constitutional vision and explain why justices are best quali-
fied to implement those principles.
150. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 237-38 (2000).
151. See Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Ban on Gay Marriages Leads List of Proposals, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2004, at AI7.
152. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997).
153. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005).
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